Islamists had for a long time been in an unenviable position: no matter how vigorously they had tried to market their political model, they were invariably at a loss when their adversaries asked them to point to a successful Islamist government anywhere in the world. To compensate for this, they almost always harked back to the “golden era” of the Rightly Guided Caliphs of early Islam, especially that of Abu Bakr and Omar, who became the first and second caliphs respectively following the death of Islam’s prophet, Muhammad.
More recently, however, some Islamists have been citing Turkey as a successful Islamist model. This is truer of the less extremist elements among them than of those who are more radical, for the latter do not seem to view the Turkish state as being genuinely Islamist (since, in their opinion, it does not implement sharia, promote jihad, or reject components of Western culture, such as democracy.) Let’s examine the above-mentioned claim, namely that Turkey represents a success story of how modern democracy and Islamism can coexist.
Turkey’s current president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had founded the Islamist-based Justice and Development party in 2001, and had led it to three general election victories, thereby becoming prime minister of Turkey for eleven years (2003-2014), before he stepped down as the party’s leader when he was elected president of Turkey in 2014.
There is no doubt that Erdogan has achieved a number of major successes in various spheres of activity: winning reasonably fair and free elections; enjoying democratic legitimacy; vastly improving the economy; reducing the high levels of corruption in the country; making serious efforts to resolve Turkey’s chronic conflict with its Kurds; improving the rights of religious minorities (e.g., by giving state-confiscated property back to Turkey’s Christians and Jews, and allowing non-Muslim religious classes in schools); and establishing good relations with the Kurdish region of Iraq. In addition, Erdogan has won the approval of many conservative Muslims, who had previously felt marginalized, by taking a number of steps aimed at enhancing the presence of Islam as a cultural force in Turkey and restoring pride in its Muslim identity. Conservative Muslim women in particular were pleased by their newly-found freedom to wear the hijab in all public places, without fearing legal repercussions. A mixture of mostly religious conservatives and economic entrepreneurs appeared to welcome Erdogan’s policies and provide him with the electoral support that he needed to continue winning elections.
On the other hand, continuous electoral success seems to have convinced Erdogan that he cannot go wrong. This feeling of inerrancy and invincibility has translated itself into manifest expressions of intolerance and authoritarianism: In reaction to mass protests against construction plans in Gezi Park, as well as against some of his restrictive policies, Erdogan clamped down on the protesters with an iron fist. This intolerance of opposition showed itself once again when he and some of the people around him were suspected of corruption, based on leaked private telephone calls: Erdogan declared the existence of an attempted coup against him, and he wasted no time in dismissing many of his opponents from their jobs, especially judges, police officers, and journalists. He even went so far as to impose censorship and other restrictions on the use of social media. In addition to his suppression of the mass media and his marginalization of the country’s independent judiciary, Erdogan displayed clear signs of disregard for the rule of law, not the least of which was his determination to ignore court orders designed to stop his illegal construction of his Presidential Palace in protected land.
Erdogan’s authoritarian measures were met with much disapproval not only within Turkey itself, but also on the international stage: the European Union, as well as various human rights organizations, voiced serious concern about Erdogan’s intolerance of opposition to his rule. However, that was not the first time that Turkey’s prime minister faced international criticism. In fact, since 2010, Erdogan had been implicating Turkey in a series of foreign policy blunders, thereby squandering a good measure of friendly relations and goodwill that Turkey had previously enjoyed: in Israel (e.g., his harsh criticism of Israel’s war against Hamas, and his comparison of Israel and Zionism with Hitler and Nazism); in Egypt (his support for the Muslim Brotherhood and denunciation of Egypt’s president, Sisi, as a “tyrant”); in Libya (his backing of Islamists allied with Misratan militias in Libya Dawn, including the Muslim Brotherhood, in the western part of Libya, as well as those of the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, which includes Ansar Al Sharia, in the eastern part); in Syria (his support for the Islamists fighting Assad, including al Qaeda’s Syrian franchise, Al Nusra Front); and in various countries, such as the Unite States, as well as some Middle Eastern countries like Iran (his tolerance of foreign jihadist crossing Turkey’s border into Syria, some of whom joined the Islamic State group (IS), as well as his refusal to let the US and its allies use American airbases in Turkey to attack IS in Syria unless Assad’s forces were also attacked and a no-fly zone was imposed.) Erdogan even undermined his own previous success in addressing the Kurdish question when he alienated many of Turkey’s own Kurds by failing to come to the aid of the Kurdish town of Kobani in Syria, at a time when it was facing the prospect of genocide at the hands of IS.
Even if we ignore the aforementioned view expressed by radical Islamists that Erdogan’s is not an Islamist government, and embrace that of the less radical Islamists that it is, one cannot help but feel a tremendous amount of unease and discomfort at the very authoritarian nature of Erdogan’s policies. Like so many others in the Middle East and beyond, especially Islamists, Erdogan appears to believe that democracy is only about winning elections; he fails to comprehend that there are other ingredients of the modern democratic system which are just as important: an independent judiciary, a free press, the rule of law, secularism, pluralism, and tolerance. Without those, mere electoral victories will almost certainly threaten human rights and destroy creative potential. By showing such a blatant disregard for what a modern liberal democracy stands for, Erdogan appears to have vitiated the very democratic system that had brought him to power. His growing authoritarianism is remarkably reminiscent of how adherents of totalitarian ideologies have dealt with democracy; namely as a mere vehicle for the establishment of dictatorship. That does not augur well for Turkey.
About the Author
Husam Dughman comes from a family that is historically descended from Europeans on his father’s side and Middle Easterners on his mother’s side. He was born in Libya and educated in Libya and the United Kingdom. Before Qaddafi came to power, Husam Dughman’s father had been the president of the University of Libya and his maternal grandfather had been a prime minister. Immediately following Qaddafi’s military coup d’état in 1969, both stood up to the Qaddafi regime and were consequently imprisoned: Husam Dughman’s father was incarcerated for a period of 10 years, during which he was subjected to regular torture by the Qaddafi regime, and his grandfather was incarcerated for five years.
In the 1990s, Husam Dughman returned to Libya and worked as a university professor of political science. Due to conflicts with the Qaddafi regime, he resigned from his university position in 1997 and subsequently worked in legal translation. Years later, Husam Dughman left Libya for North America, where he has been working as a Newcomer specialist, helping new immigrants with their settlement. He currently resides in the United States.
Husam Dughman has recently published a book, Tête-à-tête with Muhammad, and he has also published various articles about the Middle East. You can find out more by visiting his website at http://www.husamdughman.com