For a long time now, a heated debate has raged among many as to whether Islamism could in any way be moderate. On the one hand, some people have argued that, in contrast to the likes of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group, moderate Islamists do exist. The advocates of this view usually point to the Tunisian Ennahda party and the multi-national Muslim Brotherhood as examples. They maintain that there is really nothing to prevent Islamism from being a positive contributor to the world, and that coexistence with it is not only possible, but also desirable. On the other hand, there are those (including the author of this article) who are skeptical of such a view, which they regard as naive and complacent. The supporters of this view point out that since Islamism is based on the idea of the dominance of Islam in a certain country’s state and society, and given that the legitimacy of that religion is derived from a belief in an all-powerful God, it cannot possibly be compatible with democracy, whose legitimacy is derived from the people. The examples provided to back up this view are numerous, and the lack of any credible Islamist governments around the world appears to lend further credence to this perspective. The adherents of the two aforementioned views have recently found themselves in disagreement once again: this time, over Tunisia’s very recent elections.
The advocates of the first view above have been quick to inform people that Ennhada party has consistently acted within Tunisia’s law, that it has been willing to share power with secular parties (2011-2014), that it has refrained from any attempts to impose Sharia, that it has not sought to undermine Tunisia’s achievements in the area of female empowerment, and that in January 2014 it chose to give up political power to a national unity government in reaction to widespread popular protests. All of this, supporters of this view explain, proves that Islamism can indeed exist peacefully and productively with the modern democratic system, and that Ennhada party’s “moderation” has been indispensable to Tunisia’s success. But, we may wonder, is this seductive argument truly sound? Let’s briefly examine the background to those events to try and see if that claim is as credible as it may initially appear.
The Arab Spring had surprised many people in more ways than one: First, the sudden outbreak of its popular uprisings in 2011 caught the world off guard; second, the Arab Spring later failed to deliver the democratic rewards which it had initially seemed to promise. The great hope that numerous people around the world had placed in the outcome of the Arab Spring were further dashed by the early rise of Islamism and the bloody conflicts that have since plagued the area. To be sure, the Arab Spring really occurred in only five Middle Eastern/ North African countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen (and, arguably, Bahrain). It was a remarkable failure in all of them, except for Tunisia. It would be worth examining the reasons why this has been the case:
One of the most egregious mistakes made in this regard by countless individuals, pundits and laymen alike, concerned the issue of democracy itself: there was widespread assumption, held by legions of Middle East observers, that if only people overthrew the tyrants who ruled over them and introduced democracy, everything would be fine. Those who subscribed to that belief did not pause to consider the context within which the modern democratic system could yield positive results. In the process, they ignored the most crucial factor: political culture. They did not appear to understand that the mere introduction of the ballot box would only lead to the empowerment of the prevailing political culture.; in other words, for the Arab Spring to succeed in producing the desired results, the political cultures of those countries where it took place would have had to have been in favour of not merely democracy, but also of secularism and liberalism (the latter, a combination of pluralism and tolerance.) Tunisia aside, the rest of the countries that experienced the Arab Spring in 2011 had very little secularism and next-to-nothing liberalism. As a result, the introduction of the ballot box subsequently gave clear expression to a head-on collision between the dominant totalitarian political cultures of the countries in question: Islamism and pan-Arabism. In Egypt (the Muslim Brotherhood vs. the army); in Libya (Ansar Al-Shariah vs. Libyan National Army/ Operation Dignity in the east, and Libya Dawn vs. Zintanis in the west); in Syria (Al-Nusra Front/ the Islamic State group vs. President Assad); and, somewhat, in Yemen (the Houthis-whose logo reads, “God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam” vs. the Yemeni government.) The only (relative) exception is Tunisia. But why?
To answer this question, one has to consider the sum total of a number of factors, rather than their own individual merits: First, and unlike a country like Libya, Tunisia has historically been an agricultural society, with the process of stable human settlement aiding in the formation of a Tunisian national identity and the emergence of firmly-established state institutions. Second, and unlike countries like Libya and Iraq, Tunisia has not been a major oil-producing country, which meant that its government has had to compromise with its revenue-generating population in order to make the state able to function. Third, and unlike a country like Algeria, Tunisia’s quest for independence from France did not involve a bloody, all-out war, thereby minimizing the role of the military in Tunisian politics. Fourth, and unlike most leaders in the region, Tunisia’s first post-independence president, Bourguiba, contributed immensely to its education, healthcare, infrastructure, women’s rights, secularism, and openness to the outside world. Fifth, and unlike the fate of similarly enlightened leaders in Egypt (King Farouk), Libya (King Idris), and Iraq (King Faisal II), Bourguiba was not overthrown by his own military, an institution which seemed to hold him in high regard and appreciate his constructive contributions to the country’s overall development. Finally, and unlike what had happened in Egypt, Libya, and Iraq, Bourguiba’s successors sought to preserve many of his national achievements.
The net result of the combination of all those aforementioned factors produced a Tunisia with well-developed state institutions, a vibrant civil society (civic/ professional associations, labour unions, and so forth), an educated populace, a strong middle-class, more female participation in various spheres of activity, and a healthy interaction with the rest of the world. It is those integral components of Tunisia’s state and society, rather than any alleged “moderation” on the part of the Islamist Ennahda party, that have been responsible for Tunisia’s relative, and only, success in the dismal and abysmal story of the Arab Spring.