Vigilance can report that Her Majesty The Queen has approved the appointment of General Sir Nicholas Houghton GCB CBE ADC Gen to take over from General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen as the next Chief of the Defence Staff in July 2013.
Mr Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Defence, said: “I am pleased to announce the appointment of the successor to the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir David Richards. General Sir Nicholas Houghton will assume this role in July 2013. I look forward to working with Sir Nicholas as we continue radical reforms to the Ministry of Defence and deliver Future Force 2020. I pay tribute to the leadership Sir David has shown as CDS during a period of significant change in the military environment while securing operational successes across the globe, including in Afghanistan and Libya.”
General Sir Nicholas Houghton GCB CBE ADC Gen
- Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
Who exactly is General Sir Houghton?
Sir Nicholas became Vice Chief of the Defence Staff in 2009 and deputises for the Chief of the Defence Staff on all defence matters.
Since his appointment to the MOD, Nicholas has held a number of senior posts including:
- 1999 to 2002: Director of Military Operations, MOD
- 2002 to 2004: Chief of Staff of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
- 2004 to 2005: Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations)
- 2005 to 2006: Senior British Military Representative Iraq and Deputy Commanding General of the Multinational Force, Iraq
- 2006: Chief of Joint Operations at PJHQ (UK).
General Houghton assumes the post of Chief of the Defence Staff in July 2013.
Ministry of Defence
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff acts as the Chief Operating Officer for the Armed Forces element of defence business, ensuring that strategic decisions are implemented.
Responsibilities
VCDS is responsible for:
- acting as CDS’s deputy for operational matters, including support to operations and contingency
- ensuring delivery of Defence Board, Chiefs of Staff and Armed Forces Committee decisions, managing co-ordination of implementation and monitoring progress
- leading on defining and delivering requirements for military capability, and being the capability sponsor for capital projects and programmes
- leading at board level on military personnel and training, including Reserves
- leading on preparing the Armed Forces input to the Strategic Defence Review
- acting as overseer of the Head Office military 3-star community to ensure the coherence of Defence business
- conducting the military strategic dialogue with China, France and Turkey.
- Chief of the Defence Staff
General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen
General Sir Richards: The Man and his world view as reflected in some of his selected speeches
General Sir David Richards is Chief of the Defence Staff, the professional head of the armed forces and principal military adviser to the Secretary of State for Defence and government. He was appointed in 2009.
Since his appointment to the MOD, David has held a number of senior posts including:
- Assistant Chief of the General Staff, 2002
- Commander-in-Chief UK Land Forces, 2008
- Chief of the General Staff, 2009
- Chief of the Defence Staff, 2010.
General Richards will be succeeded in post in July 2013.
Ministryof Defence Chief of the Defence Staff
The Chief of the Defence Staff is the professional head of the Armed Forces and principal military adviser to the Secretary of State for Defence and the government. The role reports to the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister.
Responsibilities
The Chief of the Defence Staff’s responsibilities include:
- leading defence (with the Permanent Secretary (PUS))
- setting strategy for defence, including the future development of the Armed Forces (subject to ministers’ direction, and together with PUS)
- the conduct of current operations (as strategic commander)
- leading relationships with other countries’ Armed Forces
Speech 2010/11/22: Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty
Organisation:
Delivered on:
22 November 2010
General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen
Speech delivered by Chief of Defence Staff at the Policy Exchange, London on Monday 22nd November 2010. Originally given at The Policy Exchange, London. These are the speaker's notes, not a transcript of the speech as it was delivered.
It is a great privilege to be here delivering the fifth of the Cramphorn lectures.
It is a particular pleasure that Mrs Cramphorn is here. Chief Constable Cramphorn was a leader in cross community relations, both in Northern Ireland with the PSNI and later in Yorkshire particularly at the time of the 7/7 bombings.
Having had Peter Clarke, Ian Blair, Charles Farr and David Petraeus appear here before me I am honoured to be following such distinguished company. The words “no pressure then” spring to mind!
Over the past month I have been getting to grips with my new appointment as Chief of the Defence Staff. Whilst I do not have time to ponder it too much, I am genuinely still somewhat baffled how I have ended up in this position. The 18 year old boy who joined 29 Commando Regiment to follow his brother would not recognise the rather care-worn man who stands before you - and would have quailed at the thought of high rank dismissing it without doubt as ridiculous anyway.
The job will not be simple, but it will be made easier by the fact that I know I will be supported by some of the most capable, dedicated and selfless soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines that this country has ever produced.
And by the civilians in the MOD who have again and again demonstrated their skills and commitment.
I am not going to dwell on people in this talk other than to say that if we fail to attract and retain the very high quality people that historically join the British Armed Forces, our prospects for the future will diminish markedly.
They lie at the heart of military capability. I am not certain the consequences of failing in this are always fully appreciated. People tend to focus more on the kit and metal than the people.
Over the next decade we will need every ounce of their dedication because the issues that we, in Defence as a whole, have to address are diverse and challenging.
And, as was the case with every one of my predecessors, I recognise that the outcome of our efforts must meet the very real challenges confronting us.
It is vital for the future security of our nation.
I speak at a time when all three services are heavily committed to operations.
In Afghanistan, off the Horn of Africa, in the Gulf and in the Falkland Islands, to name a few prominent examples, the Navy, Army and Air Force are together ensuring the UK’s interests are defended.
They and the civilians who work alongside them across the Ministry of Defence, and indeed on operations themselves, have rarely been pushed so hard.
Current commitments demand our endurance and test our resolve.
But I have no doubt that with the support of the people of this country - support not only for who we are but for what we do - the Armed Forces will meet every challenge thrown at us. I am confident that they will not let you down.
I wanted to talk to you this evening about three things:
First, the National Security Strategy which is the guiding document for our analysis. It set the strategic context for and then shaped the Strategic Defence and Security Review, as it will the follow-on work. It is, in military speak, our Commander’s Intent.
Secondly, the Review itself; the options we had, the choices we made and the military judgments that lay behind them. As with any outcome that is properly strategic in its approach, our military judgments are matched to the resource it is deemed the country can afford.
This has required the difficult decisions we have taken to be a reasoned balance of acceptable risks.
And third is Afghanistan; the last in this list but the absolute priority of the National Security Council and the Armed Forces. The Defence Secretary reiterated in parliament this month that it is our Main Effort. And as I have said in the past, our actions in Afghanistan are vital for the short and long term national security of our country.
The consequences of the choices made there will reverberate for many years to come, on international security and stability but also on the ability of Britain to exert influence worldwide.
When the government announced it was calling a Strategic Defence and Security Review it expanded the remit of traditional Defence Reviews.
Linking wider security to defence and preceding it with a proper Strategic outlook has pulled together themes that have too often, and detrimentally, been considered separately.
Based on the National Security Strategy, the SDSR has set us on the path to reform the nation’s defence.
It has embedded importantly the experience of a decade on operations into a plan for the future.
To understand this you must see the SDSR not as an end state but as part of a process. It is not the final word but a stage in the evolving role of our armed forces.
It is a waypoint to guide the first stage of transformation.
As part of this the SDSR recognises the change in a generation of servicemen and women.
Officers who were company commanders in Northern Ireland at the time of the last Defence Review in 1998 are now generals with many tours of Iraq and Afghanistan under their belt.
Airmen who joined for adventure are now flight sergeants with hours of combat missions, and experience of leadership in the most trying conditions.
Since that last Review in 1998 the UK Armed Forces have undertaken over a hundred operations and paid a heavy price. More than 560 of our comrades-in-arms have been killed.
These operations have seen new equipment, new people and new doctrine all play their part in the changing character of conflict and have moulded the forces that we now seek to transform.
And they have challenged the way we do things.
As the historian Corelli Barnett put it: War is the auditor of institutions.
The effectiveness of the system of Urgent Operational Requirements for procurement is, for instance, but one good thing that we need to embed into our wider processes.
As our experience has grown, so our understanding of modern conflict has grown.
For the military in particular these changes have been marked by a coming together of types of conflict.
Wars today have begun to look increasingly similar, whether they are fought by states or non-state actors, by armies, militias or rebel groups.
So change is ever present in the military field. But the National Security Strategy and the SDSR have given us the opportunity to place that change in its proper strategic context, helping to ensure that transformation is objectively directed rather than simply imposed by events. The government’s pledge to hold regular reviews recognises this continuing evolution.
I am reminded of Churchill’s words: To improve is to change; to be perfect is to change often.
The time it takes to build a ship or to train an army or an air force means it is right that the security posture we require is kept under permanent review. And the government’s pledge does just that.
But the SDSR does not stand alone. It must be seen in the context of the threats facing our country, and the national finances.
Let me take these in turn.
The decisions taken in the SDSR have rightly been taken on the basis of the excellent analysis done by the National Security Strategy which looks beyond the immediate five years at the range of risks the nation faces. The National Security Strategy has not been given as much prominence as the SDSR and it should be given more.
It is an impressive piece of work by a mixed team of officials, both civilian and military, from several departments.
The NSS shapes the debate, identifies the issues and gives us the direction of travel.
As the Prime Minister said in Parliament, “the defence review flows from strategic thinking about Britain’s place in the world, about the threats we face and about how we can bring all of the Government together to try to deal with that.”
In military language, as I said earlier, we would call this our “Commander’s Intent.”
It points to the themes that rightly sit at the heart of our national security.
Not just Afghanistan or the threat of nuclear proliferation but also less recognised issues. Advances in biological science, climate change and social and demographic change are taken into account.
I am reminded of last week’s report to the US Congress that, for a time, some 15 percent of the world’s internet traffic was diverted through Chinese servers.
This changes what we mean by “supply lines” or “global commons”. The UK’s trade is now so dominated by financial services that the internet is as vital to us today as shipping routes were a century ago.
The National Security Strategy lists these threats and it is worth remembering the most pressing:
They range from international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, sabotage, espionage, dissident Northern Ireland groups, through natural hazards and cyber attack to the economic situation.
I am reminded of the Foreign Secretary’s words in Washington last week that, in “Britain we have never shirked the international responsibilities conferred on us by our economic and military strength.”
Given this complex under-pinning, the strategic context if you will, the choices we make must accommodate a wide spectrum of threats.
That is why our so-called adaptable posture is the right one.
And finance is clearly part of the strategic context.
As the Defence Secretary has said: “Our economic strength underpins our military strength.”
He is, of course, right. The financial security of the nation must be a primary consideration of any review. If you need an example of a government failing to get this formula right, pause to recall the fate of the Soviet Union. Moscow’s attempt to match US defence spending contributed to a bankrupt state which led to its collapse.
A plan is not a plan if it doesn’t take into account the resources available.
It is a wish list and no general worth his salt bases his plan on wishful thinking.
This SDSR has been no different and builds on the reality of the position in which we find ourselves.
That of course has required us to make judgements that trade the perfect for the acceptable. The Review prioritises on the basis of our assessment of risk. It ensures we never fall into the trap of gambling.
We have done so under strategic direction that recognises the changing character of conflict and the threats we face, now and in the future. It charts a path of longer-term transformation.
What was absolutely necessary to have in one’s armoury even 10 years ago, may well not be so vital in the future. Understanding this dynamic is absolutely essential. It was Liddel-Hart who remarked that there is only one thing more difficult than getting a new idea into the military mind and that is getting an old idea out!
Difficult decisions are a fundamental element of command so in that context I want to address two of the decisions we took that attracted some comment:
Firstly the decision to continue with the purchase of the carriers
And secondly the decision to decommission the Harrier fleet and retain the Tornados.
The case for carriers was not supported by everyone. Some argued that they were no longer necessary; that the range of modern jets, extended by a fleet of tanker aircraft, and our basing agreements mean they are part of yesterday’s arsenal.
I don’t agree.
Whilst I consider it an acceptable risk be without carrier strike for the next decade, I do not think, and did not during the SDSR debate it prudent to assume a future that discounts ever requiring them again.
But it is worth being clear.
The gap in carrier-based aircraft does not diminish our ability to defend the Falkland Islands.
The situation in the South Atlantic is very different to that of 1982.
Our strategy is based on deterrence and defence, ie for once learning the lessons of 1982. So today, our defences much greater with a capable sea, ground and air presence
Furthermore the government in Buenos Aires is now a democracy, not a military dictatorship, based on the rule of law and tied into a network of alliances, both regional and international. The Argentine foreign minister emphasised in an interview this month that they would seek to take the islands through peaceful means.
Once all this was understood and agreed, and given that our finances required us to remove a complete fast jet type, the issue of whither Harrier or Tornado could be based on current and anticipated operational need.
In this, the choice was made for us some time ago.
When the decision was taken in 2009 to reduce the Harrier fleet to 32 aircraft it became impossible to sustain operations in Afghanistan, and maintain an adequate contingent capability for the unexpected, with just the Harrier.
Of course the world will not stand still.
The short delay to the first carrier, to allow it to be fitted with ‘cats and traps’, means that when it comes into service in 2019 it will be equipped with the hugely capable carrier variant of Joint Strike Fighter.
That will mean we will have greater flexibility over their 50 years lifespan and will ensure we are prepared for a less predictable future.
For other types of equipment similar decisions have had to be taken: numbers of tanks and artillery will be cut, numbers of people reduced and ships paid off.
To be clear, that does not mean that equipment that was once the backbone of our Navy, Army, and Air Force is now useless.
It is all a question of scale and context. And because we have prioritised against identified risks but not foregone any major capability, we retain the flexibility to evolve and grow back that which a changing strategic environment suggests wise in the future.
We must not structure so much for hybrid warfare that an enemy’s asymmetric advantage could become it’s possession of conventional weapons. I do not think this is a major risk but it is one to monitor.
Anyway, we need to retain such equipment for today’s threats. Fighter aircraft are used to protect the skies over Britain. Tanks have been deployed in counter-insurgency operations not just by the UK in Iraq but by ISAF in Afghanistan and by the Pakistanis, in considerable numbers and most successfully, in the FATA. The Americans are deploying tanks to Helmand now.
Reflecting a different but very real threat, the SDSR also mandates the formation of a UK Defence Cyber Operations Group.
The detailed structure of the group has yet to be determined, but it will be a fundamental part of our strategic operations, and will be able to plug into other security organisations outside Defence.
Some of you will also have heard me talk about the importance, in this fast moving digital age, of information as a part of conflict. In some respects a weapon in its own right. Reflecting this in our organisation, training and tactics is our next task.
This leads me nicely on to Afghanistan, a war in which information and influence is central to success.
Today in Helmand, the UK and the US have achieved what few expected even two years ago.
Governor Mangal of Helmand, with whom I met only a few weeks ago, told me how he drove everywhere and expected his staff to do the same.
When I commanded in Afghanistan that would have been unimaginable.
The right force levels have delivered what we knew was possible but seemed unattainable.
As agreed at the NATO Conference in Lisbon, the ANSF will take the lead on security from the end of 2014. This is why, as the Prime Minister said, British troops will not be on combat operations from 2015 although, and I quote, “it may be in our interests to make a decent sized contribution … to go on training their armed forces”.
2015 in my judgement is an achievable deadline and a realistic ambition. But as David Cameron has already stated, I anticipate our relationship with Afghanistan continuing for many years to come and we will stay the course with our Afghan and Pakistani allies.
For the UK to leave without an enduring relationship with the Afghan people would be a mistake but let me be clear what I mean by that.
With India and Pakistan, nations with whom we have a history longer and in some ways more fraught than with Kabul, we now have enduring partnerships as equals. Diplomatic, development and defence agreements underpin our relations and we look forward to deepening them over the years.
Afghanistan will, I am confident, contribute to the network of partners and allies that the UK has developed over the centuries.
Prioritising these, as well as our interactions with the rest of the world more generally, will be part of our development of Grand Strategy - work in which I look forward to supporting the government and the National Security Council in particular.
Getting it right will transform the Ministry of Defence and enable us properly to fulfil our mandated role as the UK’s strategic military headquarters, in support of government policy.
But that is something I will address on another occasion.
I would like to summarise briefly what I have said:
The National Security Strategy has provided us with the strategic context for subsequent decisions. It is our commander’s intent from which we can derive a national Grand Strategy that links ends, ways and means in the traditional, but for a while now somewhat neglected, manner.
The Strategic Defence and Security Review is the first part of this rolling process.
It takes into account the financial and global situation in which we find ourselves and makes calculated judgments that balance risks against resource.
We cannot prepare for everything. We cannot be instantly ready for every eventuality. But we can be prepared, in close concert with allies, for the most likely contingencies and structured and equipped to deal with the greatest threats.
We must prioritise for today’s operations. It is no good being ready for tomorrow if that risks losing today.
All this is balanced to ensure we can fulfil our standing commitments to the people of the United Kingdom in guaranteeing the protection of our air and sea space and to the people of the Falkland Islands for whom we fought so hard thirty years ago. Equally we take very seriously our obligations to allies and partners whom we are committed to support.
But the Armed Forces do not do this alone.
As one of my successors as Commander ISAF, Gen McChrystal put it: “it’s an axiom in the Army that soldiers write the checks but families pay the bills”.
So I say that if you find me here today humbled by the responsibility I hold but confident about the future, it is because I stand on the shoulders of giants, supported by the families of the nation they serve with such distinction.
Thank you.
Speech: Chief of the Defence Staff General Sir David Richards speech to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 17 December 2012
Organisation: Ministry of Defence
Delivered on: 17 December 2012
Speaker: General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen
Introduction
Thank you Lord Hutton for your kind introduction. It is good to see so many friends and colleagues here and may I take… Originally given at Royal United Services Institute, London, UK. This is a transcript of the speech, exactly as it was delivered.
Introduction
- Thank you Lord Hutton for your kind introduction. It is good to see so many friends and colleagues here and may I take the opportunity to thank you all for your strong support to the Armed Forces. It is hugely appreciated.
- I am feeling slightly cautious this evening. Our senior Defence Attaché in the Americas tells me that in the Aztec calendar today is the Day of the Lizard. They say:
- ‘The warrior must be like the lizard, who is not hurt by a high fall but, instead, immediately climbs back to its perch. These are good days to keep out of sight; bad days to attract attention.’
- So perhaps today isn’t the best time to be standing before you!
- In honouring my commitment to this august organisation that plays such an important role in the life of UK Defence, I want to take the opportunity to examine where we are today, what deductions we should draw, and what we are doing to ensure we are prepared for tomorrow.
- You are all aware of how much change there has been over the past two years. We have begun to introduce the SDSR, balanced the books and turned a corner in Afghanistan. Yet much of the world seems less stable and more dangerous than was the case even two years ago; a harsh world in which intra-state conflict can be confused by and for new forms of inter-state conflict. A world in which governance vacuums present opportunities for extremist groups to perpetrate large-scale violence and disruption, especially as precision-strike capabilities, cyber instruments and bio terror weaponry become inevitably more accessible. And this in a period when economic fragility makes us both more vulnerable and less able to respond in a confident and timely manner, a reality aggravated by the huge cost differentials between western forces and non-state opponents.
- All this is demanding much from all of us and is changing the shape and capabilities of the Armed Forces.
- Together with my fellow Chiefs I have been examining, as you would expect, how we should best use what we have and what we need for the future. We have to be hard-nosed realists; accepting we have less than we would wish but that we are still required to protect this nation’s interests through the projection of military force. We cannot shrug our shoulders and hope the problem will go away. We have to be ready to fight and fight effectively, often not on our own terms and accepting the constraints we are under. I have brought this together in a piece of work I will be sharing in the future called How We Will Fight. And I will look at some of its key deductions in a moment.
10. We should be under no illusions; the Armed Forces of tomorrow, like those of today, will be engaged in operations around the world. They will require the best of their generation as they always have. People who can think flexibly and with imagination. As Einstein said, “imagination is more important than knowledge”.
11. These operations will not be carbon copies of Afghanistan or Libya. But they will require the same skill and dedication that these operations, and all the others we have engaged in since the Cold War, have demanded. They will require the strength and indeed guile that our Army, Navy and Air Force are famous for.
12. Building on the battle-winning reputation, proven resilience and technological edge of the past decade, I hope you won’t notice some of the tasks the Armed Forces will be doing. They will be performing a key part of our developing military strategy – deterrence. Preventing conflict, you may recall, is rightly a principal task of Defence.
13. I will come back to this theme later but it is worth remembering that your Armed Forces are often most effective when they are not in the headlines. Few operations, exercises or training missions are widely reported but each one communicates that we are strong, credible and reliable. This deters our enemies and reassures our friends.
14. And we should be proud of our nation’s record in this respect. The relative peace we have enjoyed here in the UK for the past 70 years is not an accident. It is in large part the result of the quiet work of diplomats building friendships, the skill of our financiers and businessmen in making our economy strong, and the courage of our Armed Forces in deterring and when necessary overcoming threats.
15. Afghanistan is an example of this lesson. With our partners in NATO/ISAF and the ANSF we have been more successful than many, regrettably, recognise.
16. I have recently returned from a visit there and, I can tell you, we are meeting the tasks laid on us. Over the past decade we have:
- a. closed Al Qaeda’s bolthole ;
- b. helped underpin a more stable government;
- c. overseen elections;
- d. trained an Army and police force;
- e. and put a country that suffered 30-years of war into a position where industry, education and the rule of law are beginning to grow.
- True, there is a long way to go. The presidential elections in 2014 will be hugely important. But we are heading in the right direction and we have proved what can be done with the right resources and with the right support.
- I look forward to 2013 seeing us increasingly transition to an Afghan lead as we move from mentoring battalions to supporting brigades.
- The Afghan Army now enjoys the support and trust of 84 percent of the country, only 3 percent less than the British Army in this country. That is a fantastic achievement, by them and ISAF. It recognises the integral part they are playing in turning the destiny of a country away from violence and onto a path of peace.
- I am proud of what our Service men and women have achieved in Afghanistan. Alongside partners in DFID and the Foreign Office we have given Afghans a chance they couldn’t have dreamt of only a few years ago.
- Our operation in Afghanistan does not stand alone. It is linked to Pakistan and India and the wider region. In my recent trip to Islamabad, a city I have got to know well, I was very encouraged by the helpful attitude of civilian and military leaders to reconciling the Taliban. The Taliban, like us, are focussed on Afghanistan’s presidential poll and the end of our combat operations in 2014. They know that the window of opportunity to play a role in their country’s future is closing.
- Every day the Afghan Army and Police grow in capability and legitimacy. Every day the government is better able to serve its people and thus better able to marginalise the Taliban. Now, surely, the time is ripe to take risk in order to find that elusive political solution 10 years of military effort and sacrifice has sought to create the conditions for? But in order to pull this off, it is vital that Afghan confidence in the West’s long-term commitment to their country is retained. Why, should this be lost, would they stay the course themselves let alone fight to protect us in 2014 when, absent successful reconciliation, we will be at our most vulnerable? And why should the Taliban reconcile, if they thought we were ‘cutting and running’? Retaining Afghan confidence is the campaign’s centre of gravity. And for the UK, retaining our influence and status within NATO and amongst key allies, is another reason for getting this right.
- While achieving our goals in Afghanistan, British Armed Forces have been active elsewhere around the world. For example:
- In Libya we fought in support of a people who wanted to be free from tyranny. We joined allies from around the world built around a NATO core. Together, we supplied the air force and the navy. The people themselves were the army. They made the change happen.
- In the seas off Somalia we are playing our part in an operation that is controlling the spread of piracy. Alongside navies from around the world, including Pakistan, India and China, reinforcing the benefit of cooperation.
10. Closer to home we have also been proud to play our part in HM the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations. And my fellow Chiefs and I were delighted to receive so many letters of support for the actions of our Regular and Reserve Service men and women during the Olympics.
11. It reminded all of us in uniform of the level of support that we enjoy amongst the people of this country. We are very grateful.
12. All this has happened as we have been going through reforms.
13. Over the past two years we have implemented some of the most radical changes to the Ministry of Defence and to the Armed Forces in decades.
14. The SDSR shrank the size of the Armed Forces and changed the governance of the department. And whilst we are aware that the Autumn Statement has further implications, a balanced budget means we can start from a firm base and better demonstrate what is at stake.
15. The new Armed Forces Committee mandates the Chiefs to resolve problems in the interests of Defence as a whole. It exploits collective military judgment and balances single service requirements in private allowing the CDS to go to the Defence Board with the underpinning authority of a combined Joint service view.
16. The AFC, the Defence Strategy Group chaired jointly by John Thomson the PUS and me, and the new style Defence Board chaired by Philip Hammond enable the MOD to be more agile and decisive in responding at the strategic level to developing threats and trends. The world is not a safe place. Some threats to our interests and allies are long term but some are very present.
17. The immediate danger of the collapse of the Syrian regime is one. We will support our allies in the region and would all like to see a diplomatic solution but cannot afford to remove options from the table at this stage. Should chemical weapons be used or proliferate, both President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron have made it clear that a line would have been crossed.
18. And Syria is linked to Iran. The regime is backed by Tehran so the fall of Assad’s dictatorship will impact the Iranian government. What that means for the stability of the region is as yet unclear.
19. In my recent trip to the Manama Dialogue I was struck by the issues that came up. Our host, Crown Prince Salman of Bahrain, emphasised the threat of nuclear proliferation. North Korea’s missile test last week aggravates this risk.
20. The Kenyan and Ugandan armed forces have been exemplary in bringing order to Somalia but this has not been without cost. Both have sustained losses, and the retaliation of terrorist groups has endangered Kampala, Nairobi and the Kenyan coast. We must continue to support both countries, as well as the fledgling Somali government.
21. To the west, Mali is a major cause for concern. As still is Yemen, despite President Hadi’s laudable efforts. So What?
22. Now reducing these short and long term threats, our task is to evolve a force capable of meeting, with allies, various complex tasks. By the early 2020s, these plans result in a powerful Joint force that, on the basis of a balanced budget from Planning Round 12, should be able to meet the requirements laid on it.
23. It has not been easy.
24. But the Secretary of State, building on the work of the SDSR, has ensured that the department is able to squeeze the most from the resources available.
25. By 2020 we will have kit that many of my fellow NATO Chiefs of Defence, saddled with much more sclerotic budgets than we, are envious of:
- a. A World Class Carrier Capability with the JSF – Lightning II – on board;
- b. Type 45 destroyers on patrol;
- c. Type 26 frigates in production;
- d. Astute class submarines;
- e. Chinook Mk 6 bringing the total Chinook fleet to 60;
- f. Typhoon Tranche 3, as well as the Lightning II;
- g. Atlas and Voyager air transport and air-to-air refuelling aircraft, underpinned by our now larger C17 fleet;
- h. Scout vehicles, upgraded Warrior, Challenger, and Apache to give the Army better reconnaissance, mobility and firepower;
- i. Rivet Joint and other critical ISTAR platforms that will ensure we have better situational awareness than ever.
- j. And much more emphasis on Cyber, to which I will return shortly.
- But our most decisive asset will remain our Service men and women.
- As the private sector puts it, we must look after the ‘talent’. As I see equipment around the world parked with no-one to operate it. Great equipment without talented people counts for little.
- We must ensure our people have the intelligence and confidence to treat the unexpected as an opportunity to exploit. They must be capable of informed, independent action; of what has been described as a ‘brains-based approach’ to operations.
- You have all heard the common refrain that we must do more with less. Well, to be frank, that is what we are doing. At the strategic level, a brains-based approach means deciding to act only when we must and then doing it well, not always kinetically.
- This type of thinking has shaped the work I have started on ‘How We Will Fight’. Assuming the approach I have just outlined, I and my fellow Chiefs have designed our forces to:
- a. act jointly and with allies, but able to act alone.
- b. be well equipped, but not tied to platforms.
- c. adapt as the environment changes.
- But we must prioritise. And as spending has tightened, we must be ruthless in our requirements and getting the most from them. Effectively targeting limited resources is, in large part, the art of military command in war and in peace through force design.
- The new UK Joint Expeditionary Force is an expression of this. The JEF promises much greater levels of integration than previously achieved especially when combined with others, as is already happening with our French allies in the Anglo/French Combined JEF. The JEF must be genuinely synergistic. It is the building block to future alliances and independent action. And we would hope that allies such as Denmark and Estonia, who have fought with distinction in a British formation in Afghanistan, will want to play key roles within the British element of the CJEF.
- What it offers is clear: an integrated joint force with capabilities across the spectrum at sea, on land and in the air. A force that can confidently be allocated a specific slice of the battle space in an allied operation or act alone. It will be the basis of all our combined joint training.
- With the capability to ‘punch’ hard and not be a logistical or tactical drag on a coalition, we will be especially welcomed by our friends and feared by our enemies.
- The JEF will be of variable size; a framework into which others fit. It will be the core of the UK’s contribution to any military action, whether NATO, coalition or independent.
- Together with critical C2 elements such as HQ ARRC and the emphasis placed on the maritime component HQ at Northwood, the JEF is designed to meet our NATO obligations.
- In the Libyan campaign, Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were able to play a vital role by bringing their regional expertise into the command structure of a NATO operation. This provided greater military and political reach. I look forward to the alliance, perhaps in part through the vehicle of the JEF, working more with non-member states.
- Britain’s JEF will be capable of projecting power with global effect and influence. Nowhere is more important to us than our friends in the Middle East and Gulf and in line with clear political intent we would expect, with other initiatives, for JEF elements to spend more time reassuring and deterring in that region. The Royal Navy
- Let me briefly examine how the How We Fight work affects the single services, starting with the Royal Navy. As the Prime Minister has put it, the Navy “keeps the arteries of trade of the global economy from hardening.”
10. The Royal Navy will continue to grow in importance. As our carrier capability comes into service it will be a key part of our diplomatic, humanitarian and military strategy. Prepared to overcome the toughest military challenges. This is its raison d’être. But I know it will be used for much more.
11. The Americans demonstrated through their deployment to Aceh and Haiti that aircraft carriers have huge strategic impact supporting people around the world. Seeing US military personnel, ships and helicopters playing such a critical role boosted the standing of the US in the world’s most populous Islamic country and undermined extremist rhetoric.
12. Hard power is an essential element of soft power. In this respect especially, numbers, or mass, still matter. We must resolve the conundrum at the heart of Bob Gates quip about ‘exquisite technology’.
13. In the future, the Chief of the Naval Staff and I have a vision for a Navy which procures ships differently allowing us to have more, not fewer platforms.
14. We must resist the pressure that has shrunk the number of platforms. Clearly that will mean rethinking the Navy, including examining the case for ships that may have a limited role in general war. But this is not new ¬¬¬– remember the corvette over the ages – and is similar to the utility of light and heavy land forces, tailored to task. And in so doing we will ensure seamanship skills and leadership qualities, so much in demand by our friends and allies, flourish into the long term.
15. The Royal Navy’s maritime and amphibious components, with 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines at the core of the latter, will be at the heart of Britain’s JEF. As the concept develops we will look to acquire ships that range from top-end war fighting elements through potentially to more vessels tailored to discrete but important tasks, to be deployed on a range of routine non-warfighting duties.
The British Army
16. The Army too is changing. Once we come out of the combat role in Afghanistan at the end of 2014, it will cease to be on permanent rotation with the burdens that imposes.
17. The Army will maintain a hard power war-fighting capability while creating the strategic influence, support and engagement ability essential to modern operations.
18. Like the Navy, these land forces must be equipped to pack a punch but war fighting is not all they’re for.
19. Conflict prevention, to which I will return in a moment, is not just sensible strategy; it is a military operation requiring appropriately configured and equipped forces.
20. The Army 2020 reforms are a fundamental re-set for the Army, making the best of a regular force a fifth smaller than when I commanded it only three years ago.
21. While we will retain three high-readiness manoeuvre brigades, we will also have ‘adaptable brigades’ to sustain enduring operations and routinely develop partnerships and knowledge around the world.
22. Though more conceptual work is needed, given the importance of the region and clear Prime Ministerial intent, I envisage two or more adaptable brigades forming close tactical level relationships with particular countries in the Gulf and Jordan, for example, allowing for better cooperation with their forces. Should the need arise for another Libya-style operation, we will be prepared. This would greatly enhance our ability to support allies as they contain and deter threats and, with our naval presence in Bahrain, air elements in the UAE and Qatar, and traditional but potentially enhanced roles in Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, would make us a regional ally across the spectrum.
23. In Africa, brigades would be tasked to support key allies in the east, west and south whilst another might be given an Indian Ocean and SE Asian focus, allowing for much greater involvement in the FPDA, for example.
24. If we are to influence, we must know what drives our friends and how to motivate them. This is not something that can be done on the eve of an operation. As these adaptable brigades develop links with countries around their region, this will create opportunities for soldiers and officers to progress their careers through linguistic and cultural specialism.
25. The Defence Engagement Strategy, prepared with the Foreign Office, will provide what I have often referred to as a ‘strategic handrail’ for engagement.
26. This will require tough decisions. If we are to invest properly in some relationships, others will naturally get less attention.
27. But if we get this right ¬– and we will – we will have deeper links to specific regional partners giving them the confidence to deal with their own problems and, when appropriate, to act in partnership with us.
28. What I have described puts military flesh on the bones of welcome, NSC endorsed, national strategy.
29. This all comes as we are increasing the Reserves and integrating them closer with the Regular forces. This will do more to increase our own capacity and ability to help friends and allies. The Royal Air Force
30. Turning now to the Royal Air Force. The rate of technological advance is most keenly felt on air platforms. This is understandable. These are complex fully networked combat and ISTAR platforms. This intelligence cuts the time between understanding and reacting. It allows us better to out-think and out-act our opponents.
31. At the same time, lift, both tactical and global, reduces the number of reserves we need to keep, giving the Armed Forces a flexibility that was unimaginable just a few decades ago.
32. Understanding and exploiting the opportunities technology presents will be decisive in maintaining our advantage – in sufficient numbers – into the future.
33. Remotely piloted air systems and novel anti-air defences have changed our understanding of both what it means to fight and defend. We must not allow sacred cows – such as the indispensability of on-board pilots – to rule the day. The Chief of the Air Staff is leading the change. By giving ‘wings’ to UAV pilots the Royal Air Force is recognising the capability of the platform and skill of the pilot.
34. Indeed, it is a reflection of how early we are in this process of transition that we still refer to remotely-piloted air systems or unmanned aerial vehicles. How long was it before we stopped referring to the horseless carriage?
35. For all three Services, their role within an integrated CJEF will be the driving force in their force development and training. Whoever the enemy, wherever the threat, we will need partners. Building them now is an investment in our own future and our capacity to succeed quickly should war break out. Cyber
36. But there is a new environment within which we must learn to manoeuvre with confidence.
37. Today Facebook, with around a billion users, is the third most populous country in the world. It exemplifies one of the most extreme changes we have seen in the past decades.
38. Cyberspace is the nervous system of our global economy. We are reliant on the internet and other networked systems for every aspect of our lives. It allows bewildering speed of action and global reach.
39. Unsurprisingly, just as crime has become e-crime, spying has increasingly become cyber espionage. We have seen nations, their proxies and non-state actors use this new space for terrorism and conflict.
40. Though not conventional assaults, the hostile cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008 and Burma in 2010 were damaging.
41. In the Middle East, there have been unprecedented levels of cyber attack over the past 24 months. Israel has reported over 44 million attempts to disrupt its government websites during recent tension around the Gaza strip. STUXNET demonstrated a new class of threat aimed at process control systems at the heart of modern infrastructure.
42. Without doubt, actions in cyberspace will form part of any future conflict. Communication and the control of infrastructure and systems has become a new environment through which combatants will further their objectives.
43. Our immediate priority must be to ensure our networks are secure and defensible, working with partners in industry and around the country to drive up standards and ensure we have robust protocols in place. This builds on the excellent work done under the National Cyber Security Strategy but Defence has particular challenges as a department, as Armed Forces and through the contractors and partners with whom we work.
44. I am determined that the Armed Forces should understand cyberspace, and how it will shape future conflict, as instinctively as we understand maritime, land and air operations.
45. This will mean changes in the way we operate: new doctrine; new capabilities; new structures, with Joint Forces Command at their heart. It will mean a new approach to growing and developing the talent we need to operate in this new, electronic, environment. Like our Secretary of State, I see an important role for reserves in this domain.
46. Winding Up
- In examining each environment separately I hope I have highlighted some of the key issues on the Chiefs’ plate and how we must respond to them. But the most important is developing an integrated Joint model.
- The JEF is neither the 1980s Canadian model nor, whilst there are some apparent similarities, is it a British version of the US Marine Corps.
- The effectiveness of the UK armed forces relies heavily on the different skill-sets and ethos of each single Service. Each adapted for its environment, and evolving as times and technology change.
- But a joint conceptual approach, based on lessons from the real world, embedded through force development, in training, on operations and though the cohering glue of modern C3I and cyber is vital to delivering the military capability the nation requires.
- This is about ensuring single Service skills meld into joint action so that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.
- The JEF won’t mean we can do more with less; it will mean, through the synergy it provides, that we get the most from what we have. And doubtless there will be some roles that we continue to leave to others, notably the USA.
- As I close let me draw some lessons from my 41 years in uniform.
- Some constants which may seem obvious in this room but are often over looked:
- a. The need for military force to influence, secure and protect is as great as ever.
- b. I joined an Army that was geared to defend Britain by fighting in Germany.
- c. Today life is more complex but the principle is the same.
- d. 9/11, and the 7/7 bombings in London show that we cannot choose our battlefields as we once did.
- e. The world is not a safer place and the distinction between home and abroad is strategically obsolete. Today it is part of a continuum.
- We cannot just stand by and hope we are ignored and danger passes us by.
- As the Foreign Secretary said in September last year: “the country that is purely reactive in foreign affairs is in decline”.
- Responses may be based on either soft or hard power, but to divorce the two is strategic blindness. Soft power is not a substitute for strength. On the contrary, it is often based on the credible threat of force, either to support a friend or deter an enemy. Hard power and soft power are intertwined.
- It is not enough to provide aid or speak kindly. Our friends want to know we are there when it counts, not just fair-weather friends. This is the confidence hard power brings. It drives equipment sales and thus industrial growth, as well as diplomatic treaties, just as it has for centuries. But hard power also does more than this: it dissuades.
- Deterrence doctrine has fallen out of fashion so perhaps you will allow me to recall some of the elements. Sun Tzu’s famous maxim is: “Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting”.
- Too often this is seen as clever posturing on the eve of battle. It is not. Training, equipping and partnering with allies enhance the aura of British power. They give us presence on the world stage and ensure that we are not tested.
- It is worth being clear: when the Armed Forces train we do not just do it to be ready, we do it to be seen to be ready. When we succeed on operations, we do not just win a battle. We prove that we can win a war.
- In a very real sense, everything the Armed Forces do deters and reassures. With enough numbers, enough equipment and with good leaders at every level, Britain is a credible threat to our enemies and a reassuring friend to our allies.
- This is cheaper than fighting and more credible than talk.
10. Reading the record of how the Soviets saw the Falklands War demonstrates this admirably. What many saw as post-colonial folie de grandeur, the Soviet leadership, rightly, saw as proof that the British Armed Forces were united with their government and people – Clausewitz’s famous trilogy – and more than a match for them.
11. It was far from the only factor, but the increase in Soviet defence spending in the 1980s which ended up contributing to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact was partly due to clarity of their failure to impose their will in neighbouring, occupied countries while Britain could liberate territory some 8,000 miles away.
12. As Chief of the Defence Staff I do not wear the burdens of office any more lightly than my predecessors. I have set out some of my concerns for the coming years and some of the ways we will think and act to meet them.
13. Under the Prime Minister’s chairmanship, The National Security Council, on which I am privileged to sit, considers all the big strategic issues that I have listed and more. It is a hugely welcome addition to Whitehall, directing and bringing clarity to national strategy and coordinating cross-government action.
14. But the nature of the world is such that what will later seem obvious, today is opaque and unpredictable. How will Europe emerge from the Euro crisis? How will the Arab Spring conclude? How will global warming affect water supplies? And what of cyber?
15. After all, grand strategy, while providing a guide to action in peacetime, is also about being prepared and balanced for what we can never know.
16. Ensuring we have enough left in the bag while actively deterring, and when required defeating, aggression against us and our friends, enough left to succeed against those ‘unknown unknowns’, is ultimately what I and my fellow Chiefs are paid for.
END
Speech: 2011/12/14 - 12th Annual Chief of Defence Staff Lecture
Organisation: Ministry of Defence
Delivered on: 14 December 2011
Speaker: General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen
Speech delivered by Chief of Defence Staff at the Royal United Services Institute, London on Wednesday 14 December 2011. Originally given at The Royal United Services Institute,
London. These are the speaker's notes, not a transcript of the speech as it was delivered.
Introduction
Thank you Lord [John] Hutton for your kind introduction. It is always a pleasure to be here at RUSI and a great honour to be delivering this, the second of my annual CDS lectures in this fabulous place. It hardly seems just over a year ago that I took over from Lord Stirrup. It’s been a busy, challenging but rewarding year.
Like all good soldiers, I am a great believer in the KISS - Keep It Simple Stupid - principle. With an eye on the clock, I intend this evening firstly to examine the Global Environment, then to look at our Response to it and some of the particular Challenges we face including transition in Afghanistan, before drawing some conclusions and then taking your questions.
The Global environment
First of all, like most of you I am clear that the single biggest strategic risk facing the UK today is economic rather than military. Over time a thriving economy must be the central ingredient in any UK Grand Strategy. This is why the euro zone crisis is of such huge importance not just to the City of London but rightly to the whole country, and to military planners like me.
Seen through my prism the world looks especially unpredictable and unstable. Let’s look at just some of the factors in our Grand Strategic analysis…
Greater US military focus on the Pacific meaning less emphasis on Europe and her problems. For the first time the Pentagon has specified that its Main Effort will be South East Asia. I know this does not mean it will turn its back on Europe and NATO but countries this side of the pond need to think through what this means to us.
A hugely complex transition and withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The destabilising effects of Iran’s nuclear ambitions in the Middle East;
The risk that the Arab Awakening leads to fissures and internal conflict that could be exported, including militant Islamism. They have diasporas reaching back to this country as does Pakistan, another state struggling with instability.
What is happening in Syria is in many experts view becoming a proxy conflict between Shia Iranians and Sunni Arabs. In the process of protecting its borders, a key NATO ally, Turkey, is intimately involved
How do we respond to China potentially becoming the world’s dominant economic power over the next 40 years? What impact will China’s need to keep its population content have on us? Equally what will the rise of the other BRICs mean for us? Natural allies or hostile competitors?
What impact will fiscal restraint and slow recovery have on European defence capabilities? Just 5 out of 28 NATO allies spend the target 2 percent on defence.
However much we rightly seek to accommodate each other’s legitimate aspirations, all this will lead to greater competition for raw materials and the risk, at a minimum, of ‘bumping into other states’ as they too seek to sustain economic growth. Then there is population growth and, in some countries, decline; what does this mean? Add global warming; terrorism; piracy and international crime to list just some, as the late and much lamented Richard Holmes might have said, of the ‘problemettes’ on my plate. And that is before another Holmesism ‘Bastards HQ’ inevitably intervenes to further complicate our calculations!
Oh and on top of all that, the Armed Forces will, with great pride, play a role in ensuring the security of the Olympic Games.
Our Response
So how do we respond to this unstable, unpredictable future? The Secretary of State said only last week: “In this volatile age it would be a bold man who would plan for military idleness.”
To the contrary, as he inferred, we expect persistent and varied challenges to our national interests to continue and have planned accordingly. The SDSR rebalanced British Defence and Security for the next decade. Those decisions, which did reduce capability in some areas albeit in part to build up capability in others, will still leave us powerful relative to our allies. We were the first to accept the implications of the global economy. We clearly won’t be the last.
All Western nations, including now the USA, are changing their defence structures. We may have to prioritise more ruthlessly now that we have fewer ships, men and planes but we will still be, in comparative terms, a front rank player in the NATO Alliance. In global terms we spend the fourth largest amount on Defence. And the Alliance will remain the most powerful military pact the world has ever known; far ahead of its nearest comparable potential adversaries.
And as the SDSR anticipated, in part for this reason, alliances will be increasingly important. NATO is the bedrock of our security. It has guaranteed peace in Europe for 60 years and, as Libya and Afghanistan demonstrate, enables us to project power efficiently in concert with others to pursue our national interests. NATO provides the structure for joint and combined operations. Those who wish to participate can do so using existing protocols and command establishments. It is impossible to replicate this quickly.
And as the world evolves, so new groupings will emerge. The most obvious is our alliance with the French. In November 2010 Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy signed a treaty that has this year has already demonstrated its worth. It is much more than the Entente Cordiale of a century ago. It is a vehicle for positive joint action. Libya sealed this for us and demonstrated the benefits to Britain, Europe and NATO of having a solid Franco-British core.
I look forward to continuing to work closely with my good friend Admiral Edouard Guillaud and I know my officers and men look forward to building-on the already solid contacts they have with their French counterparts.
The UK will require other carefully chosen alliances over the coming decade through which to influence the strategic landscape and help determine the outcome of fast moving crises. Already our collaboration with countries in the Gulf and Africa has delivered results in the region, for surprisingly little cost. Perhaps we should be focussing our defence relationships on these regions rather than competing for influence, with many others, in for example, China or India? The Foreign Office and MOD are working on a new Defence Engagement methodology to help us answer some of these questions.
This strategic evaluation of our alliances will have to include a proper review of not just the Arab world and Africa but also of Russia and other countries. Where do they sit amongst our interests? Indeed are we really certain what those interests are? To help us I have argued that we need a strategic handrail to guide our interactions and focus our efforts.
Without such a handrail we risk spreading the jam too thinly, annoying our natural allies for failing to support them properly while wasting our efforts investing in others when they are already well supported by others, often our close partners. I will return to this theme shortly.
Alliances not only have the benefit of extending our reach and providing us with allies in times of need, they can also assist with the government’s Prevention strategy. Treating the causes of instability and terrorism at source is better and cheaper than dealing with the consequences, as Somalia’s piracy demonstrates. The non-traditional skills sometimes needed mean reserve forces could add value to this task in a way regular units may find harder.
Reserves would also allow us to enhance the flexibility of our forces through the concept of readiness. In order to prioritise for the most likely, we must accept that some capabilities will be held at different levels of readiness. Readiness in my judgement is a very useful defence planning discriminator and discipline.
Under the VCDS’s guiding hand, the MOD and single services are working through the implications of all this for the Royal Naval Reserve, the Royal Marines Reserve and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force as well as the Army.
As we reduce in size we must put greater emphasis on education. Countries which lose the ability to think lose the ability to plan and evolve. Armies that maintain their intellectual flame can adapt to new technologies even though they may be unable to acquire them immediately. The increasingly complex and networked world in which we will operate for the rest of our lifetimes demands ever more educated and flexible people.
Adopting tactics to fit the kit we have rather than the kit we wished we had will be a duty of commanders at all levels. Constantly pushing for the highest level of technological capability can distort priorities when a “good enough” solution may in many areas be sufficient. Balancing the feasible against the useable is the First Sea Lord, CGS and CAS’s job and I look forward to their creativity being freed by the Levene reforms which have put them much more firmly in charge of their Services.
The new Joint Force Command will champion cyber and ISTAR while the Armed Forces Committee will help shape our forces in line with the reforms former-Secretary of State Dr Liam Fox initiated. Together this will go towards shaping military strategy, balancing desired ends with acceptable ways and affordable means.
Many of you will have heard me talk about strategy before. I will not apologise as I think this is an essential part of what a strategic military headquarters does. I know that some in the UK hold the view that the Grand or National Strategy that should inform subordinate strategies is not something government needs to do.
They say instead that national strategy comes naturally from national and individual webs of interest. Things like terms of trade, ethnicity, culture, and so on, not something to be stated but rather allowed to emerge.
You will forgive me for finding this wishful thinking. It is not strategy but tactics: the essential - and honourable - art of momentary advancement and advantage. What it is not is an assessment of the issues beyond any government’s control, in order to inform a strategic handrail to guide policymakers as they navigate a country through the vicissitudes of the unstable world I described a moment ago.
In financial terms, if you’ll excuse a contemporary analogy, a state that lacks national strategy leads to day trading, not fund management!
I know I am not alone in arguing that strategy matters. The government’s National Security Council demonstrates clear intent while the Foreign Office has reinvigorated a post to oversee strategy, while in the MOD Lord Levene sanctioned the post of DCDS Military Strategy and Operations, properly supported by an ACDS Military Strategy.
Some esteemed members of this very institution have been very helpful in developing understanding of the place of strategy in the national dialogue and perhaps I could single out your director general, Michael Clarke, for his support in arguing the need for strategic literacy across Whitehall.
The Prime Minister has led the way in much of this, beginning the process by putting in place the structures to debate national strategy.
At the National Security Council he chairs a debate with interested parties arguing properly for their perspective. The ability to have this discussion allows us to conclude with a clear understanding of what we in the military term ‘Commander’s Intent’; in this case, Prime Ministerial Intent. It is vital to have this common understanding of what is required or sought. It unifies our actions and allows subordinate commanders, or ministries, to test and adjust their sub-plans.
The recent operation in Libya demonstrated this as the National Security Council was essential in achieving coherence. I welcome the greater focus it has given to strategy. I know that it’s secretariat is now turning their attention to longer term strategic challenges in the way the Chiefs of Staff Committee, ably marshalled by a civil servant, albeit one with a fine military pedigree, did so well in the 1920s and 30s.
It was largely work produced by the Chiefs’ Committee that convinced the government that the Treasury’s famous 10-year rule - presuming peace for a decade into the future - had to end as a resurgent Germany was clearly rearming. Whilst today this work would rightly be coordinated by the NSC Secretariat, I know the National Security Adviser - and we paid a fond farewell to the present incumbent Sir Peter Rickets earlier today in No 10 - would be the first to say that the Chiefs of Staff Committee remains vital in informing its work.
We must remain vigilant in ensuring developing threats are recognised and balanced appropriately. It is no good, for example, planning for a perfect force in say 2030 if we cannot protect our vital interests in the interim. And, as we look out at the world of 2012 and 2013, it would be perverse if we were not to keep this constantly under review.
Such an assessment would offer the strategic handrail I mentioned. It would guide our planning assumptions and test our ideas.
Within the military strategic sphere, the challenges that remain are considerable. I have emphasised the importance of Alliances if smaller national militaries are together going to compensate for individual shortcomings. But do we have the confidence to rely on others for complete capabilities? This will be an acid test. Progress in NATO’s Smart Defence initiative will be an early indicator. To succeed, we need to design mechanisms that oblige other nations to provide what is vital in a crisis and it won’t be easy.
Linked to this is the need to inject agility into a generally sclerotic acquisition process in which nations find themselves locked in to programmes that, as operating environments change, no longer answer the exam question. How do we find the headroom to equip our forces better with ISTAR and cyber capabilities, for example? To reassure you, this is top of the Secretary of State’s and his new Defence Board’s agenda.
I am sometimes asked if the professional military really can think and plan jointly and strategically. Well the Armed Forces Committee provides the Chiefs with the mechanism to do so and the opportunity to get out of perceived single service straightjackets. I can tell you that they are determined to exploit that opportunity and to date I am delighted by what the Committee is achieving.
The Armed Forces Committee also prepares me for the Defence Board. Whilst this may change, I am currently the only military person on the new Board. The Committee allows me to understand the different perspectives of the single Service Chiefs. It is my duty to record their views but then to give my own professional advice, which may not be based on a consensus.
Afghanistan
But the time has now come to describe the Defence’s Main Effort and my greatest challenge today - Afghanistan.
The UK will be out of the combat role by the end of 2014. My key role over the next three years is to ensure that British forces leave in good order, enabling the decisive elements of an enduring campaign - those based on effective ANSF, governance and development - to continue over the coming decades…
This is not a change of strategy but a change in ownership of that strategy. As it ‘transitions’ to Afghan leadership, the international community will remain four square behind the Afghan people, in our interests and theirs. Those amongst some of the TB leadership, and no doubt the few surviving members of AQ core, who hope they can wait us out and that a rotten fruit will fall back into their laps will be proved wrong. Bonn sealed that and Chicago will build further on it.
The Afghan National Security Forces will shortly reach a total strength of 352,000 - if only I had an Armed Forces of that size! Already, the ANSF are leading some 50 percent of conventional and Special Forces missions and they have taken over lead security responsibility from ISAF forces for more than 25 percent of the population. That will soon increase to 50 percent.
As this continues, the insurgency is reducing. Attacks in Afghanistan are down 28 percent on last year. And for the ninjas amongst you, the real measure of Taliban competence - the number of complex attacks - over the last 12 weeks is 41% down on what it was in the same 12-week period in 2010. Generals McCrystal and Petraeus had good reason for believing the surge would work and they are being proved right.
The operation is on track. We are succeeding and the population supports our efforts, as the latest Asia House analysis shows. Still the Taliban can play one card. They operate in the world of perceptions and convince many in the UK and elsewhere to see the operation as it was, not as it is. Perception lags reality by some 18 months. While we are, like a chess player, planning three or four moves ahead we cannot signal our plans openly. That leaves the media frequently, and understandably, to look only at what has happened. They frequently draw the wrong conclusion. If you want to see how those on the ground perceive the situation, and have a view on the commitment, resolve and optimism of the Afghan people, I commend this excellent Asia House report.
Of course the picture is not all rosy. Risks to the strategy remain. In a technical military sense what we have to do is complex and demanding. And despite Pakistan’s efforts to address the problem, which have resulted in many casualties in the Pakistan Army and in the Frontier Force - casualties that are too often overlooked by outsiders - TB safe havens remain in the FATA. It is important to recognise that Pakistan shares this burden with us. And I know that Pakistan will continue to do all it can to assist in bearing down on the insurgency both militarily and, more importantly in many ways, politically, in both their and our interests.
Finally it is always worth remembering, a few months on from 9/11’s 10th Anniversary, that our own national security underpins what we are doing in Afghanistan. Ten years ago I would have felt no need to mention it. It is interesting to note how quickly many outside government forget that the ungoverned, unstable space that was Afghanistan became everyone’s problem on 9/11 and the UK’s own home-grown 7/7 bombers were trained in Pakistan.
Libya
Many of the lessons we learnt in Afghanistan have since been applied to Libya.
Operation ELLAMY was a cross government operation in which the military protected the population to allow them to shape their own future.
Problems remain, of course, not least in assisting the new administration to unite fully and establish a legitimate government in the country, and in the eyes of the region. But, with allies, our Foreign Office - and our excellent ambassador in Tripoli in particular - is working to help them achieve that.
At heart this operation was a success because of the constructive and synergistic role played by a number of nations, principally but not exclusively under NATO guidance and leadership. This was the SDSR’s emphasis on the importance of allies playing out in front of our eyes. Our cooperation with the French could not have been closer while our ability to use existing NATO structures allowed us to act quickly and effectively avoiding confusion. The role played by the United States of America was fundamental to success.
Integrating the Qataris, Emiratis and Jordanians into the operation was also vital. Without them and their defence chiefs’ leadership, especially the huge understanding they brought to the campaign, it is unlikely that the NTC’s militias could have successfully acted as the land element without which the right outcome would have been impossible.
Libya has been sold as an air operation. Certainly our Tornadoes and Typhoons performed brilliantly in repeatedly striking targets with no collateral damage. Indeed the Royal Navy, British Army Apache pilots and Royal Air Force all performed to their usual exemplary standard.
But our mandate was civilian protection and enforcement of a No Fly Zone. The Libyan people, operating on the ground, made the decisive changes to the future of their country. That could not have been, should not have been, and was not done by a Coalition operating from the air.
They were the land element. An ‘army’ was still vital. As this was delivered by our Arab partners, both from Libya and the
Gulf.
Libya is not a template but one key lesson for us is this need for partners. Our alliances, formal and informal, established and new, will help shape our military actions over the next decade.
As we find it harder to maintain large armies or politics make it more difficult to employ them in isolation from others, partnering will become more vital. We will increasingly operate alongside local, more culturally acceptable forces. And the British Army’s role in building these partnerships in advance of combined operations or pre-emptively will be crucial. Yet the credibility of our overseas training teams and UK-based courses is built on battlefields around the world.
While we were essentially able to rely on Arab partners and the NTC in Libya and can assist for example AMISOM’s vital mission in Somalia indirectly, it would be foolhardy indeed and against all the lessons of history to imagine that we will never deploy combat troops again. When our vital national interests are threatened or the case for a humanitarian intervention becomes overwhelming, we cannot rely on others always to fight our battles.
In sum, the ingredients to every campaign will always be the same but the formula one uses to mix them will depend on the unique circumstances confronting us on the day. Air, land and sea components will have to be balanced in different theatres in different ways just as will the blend of diplomatic and economic activity.
Conclusion
As I conclude, it is worth recapping on some of the essentials of the past year and what it means.
The country’s main effort must be the economy. No country can defend itself if bankrupt.
It is for this reason that I and Ursula Brennan, our PUS, are working hard to control our spending. Future Force 2020 is the essential vehicle for this exercise. It seeks to maximise our military effectiveness and maintain our relative military standing.
But we need to combine realism with imagination. We must be content with the good enough and ensure training and relevant tactics make up for the exquisite technology we may have aspired to. It will require us to accept that some capabilities will be kept at lower readiness or, (horror of horrors!), sometimes provided by others. It will mean taking risk. But managing risk is ultimately what we do and none of us in the Armed Forces are discomforted by the challenge.
At the same time, we must constantly check that spending on future capability is not at the expense of something vital we need today or that we cannot respond to fresh demands; we must ensure it remains an agile process.
While there are no templates and each security challenge will be different, we will require allies, not only established ones like our NATO partners but also non-traditional countries which will challenge our interoperability but offer opportunity and reach.
Innovative thinking and most importantly retaining a warrior ethos will prove decisive in staying ahead.
We are excellent at this which is one reason why I am confident that we are broadly in good shape and will have a seriously capable Joint force in 2020. Indeed, the principal reason for my confidence is not the equipment but the quality of the men and women who serve.
As the Defence Secretary said in this very room: “the quality of our people is a force multiplier.”
I couldn’t agree more. Throughout the 40 years I have had the honour to serve I have never failed to be impressed by the quality, drive and ingenuity of the men and women alongside me. Like no doubt all my friends, I never expected to be their professional head but it is a sheer delight and great privilege to be so.
Before I finish I would like to thank all those who have supported the Armed Forces in whatever capacity this year. A family’s forbearance; a cheering crowd at a homecoming parade; those standing silently as a cortege passes by; or those on Remembrance Sunday standing shoulder to shoulder with so many around the country; are all things that I would like to thank both the families and citizens of the UK for. They are essential in the fighting capability of Britain’s Armed Forces and we are most grateful.
Thank you.
Speech: 2010/12/14 - 11th Annual Chief of Defence Staff Lecture
Organisation: Ministry of Defence
Delivered on: 14 December 2010
Topic: Establishing stability in Afghanistan+ 1 other
Speaker: General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen
Speech delivered by Chief of Defence Staff at the Royal United Services Institute, London on Tuesday 14 December 2010. Originally given at The Royal United Services Institute, London.These
are the speaker's notes, not a transcript of the speech as it was delivered.
INTRODUCTION
Ladies and Gentlemen, it is an honour to give the 11th annual Chief of Defence Staff lecture here at RUSI - and it is a very important opportunity for someone in my position to draw to a conclusion the year. A lot of people say to me congratulations on becoming Chief of the Defence Staff but then a friend of mine said it should be commiserations and I want to tell you I don’t feel that.
When this series of lectures began in 1999, General Guthrie, gave the inaugural address.
He had just led the Armed Forces through the 1998 Strategic Defence Review.
I don’t think he’s here but if he was he would re-affirm how difficult the task of the Chief of the Defence Staff is during a Defence Review and indeed one might say these days thereafter but I’m learning that still.
So I would like to start by paying tribute to my immediate predecessor Sir Jock Strirrup.
He brought huge experience and sagacity to the role through a difficult time for Britain - a time in which our Armed Forces were fighting on two fronts in Iraq and Afghanistan - a time in which the threat to our nation was, and continues to be, diverse, evolving and clearly unpredictable - and at a time when the country’s fiscal position has required significant belt-tightening across Government - and rightly in my view including in Defence.
Jock said to me as he handed over “you will realise that this job is quite different from any others” and I thought “I think I know what you mean”, then Lord Guthrie said something similar and I can tell you that they are right, it is a different job to any other…
As difficult as the decisions in the SDSR have been - they have now been made and as an amateur historian, I would agree that life can only be understood by looking backwards, so I do want to set out the thinking behind what we call the adaptable posture we will assume as a result of the SDSR.
But life can only be lived by moving forward.
We have received, in military speak, as those servicemen here will know what we call our Commander’s Intent in the form of the National Security Strategy - which by the ways tends to be slightly obscured by the SDSR itself which I think we would term in the military our specific orders.
My task as CDS is to lead the Armed Forces through the changes required.
I want to look at how we in the Ministry of Defence, as well as examining the SDSR and its aftermath, can contribute more widely to the development of defence and security strategy across Whitehall.
But first, and I have just come back from Afghanistan and Pakistan, I would like to talk about the progress being made in Afghanistan, which is the absolute priority of the National Security Council, the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces - and will remain our priority over the coming years and was an essential consideration in the SDSR.
AFGHANISTAN
The Defence Secretary reiterated in Parliament last month that Afghanistan is our Main Effort.
And as I have said in the past, our actions there are vital for the short and long term national security of our country.
I was in Afghanistan three weeks ago and again last week with the Prime Minister and the change from when I commanded there in 2006 could not be more apparent.
Today, Governor Mangal is driving around Helmand and officials are travelling alone to and from their districts,
I took chai with local people in the heart of Nad Ali District overlooking a road busy with people and traffic.
In 2006, that would have been unimaginable.
The right force levels, with the right equipment across ISAF as a whole, but particularly in Helmand, are now delivering what we knew then was the right strategy but seemed unattainable: a strategy that has seen General Petraeus achieve so much by focussing on the people and a political settlement.
Asia Foundation polling reported earlier this month that this is beginning to pay off: 47 percent of the people think the country is heading in the right direction.
That’s the highest percentage since polling began five years ago.
Of course, the significant uplift in troop numbers means an accelerated tempo of operations and we can expect the going to remain tough and more lives to be lost - including British lives.
Because war is never without risk and risk is intrinsic to military operations.
Those of us in the military absolutely understand that, we sometimes have a struggle getting it across to others. It is recognised by every soldier, every sailor, every airman and every marine I lead.
The public is right to honour their bravery and commitment. But supporting the servicemen and women means understanding their mission.
Because the mission in Afghanistan, as our Prime Minister has made clear, is one of national security.
Our forces are there ultimately, to keep the public here in Britain safe - safe from the consequences of failure in Afghanistan; safe from the violent extremists who would make the region their base; and safe from the operations that terrorists would train for and plan from those havens.
The sacrifice being made is not being made in vain. It is absolutely in keeping with the proud heritage of the British Armed Forces.
There is cause for cautious optimism, despite significant challenges.
We are now operating from a position of increasing strength while the position of the insurgency has undoubtedly begun to deteriorate.
In Pakistan, safe havens are being squeezed by Pakistani Security Forces.
The insurgency is under unprecedented pressure and has lost significant ground in their southern heartland, including in the key population centres.
We have been successfully targeting their bomb-making networks and their command structure.
Their senior leadership is isolated, their training becoming deficient, and their supplies disrupted.
The Afghan National Security Forces have grown by over a third this year, ahead of the agreed targets, and are increasingly effective and beginning to lead operations - which along with the political outreach is key to the plan for transition to home grown security.
As agreed at the NATO Conference in Lisbon, and according to the wishes of the Afghan Government, the ANSF will take the lead on security from the end of 2014.
This is why, as the Prime Minister said, British troops will not be in combat roles by 2015.
Of course, we all recognise that the UK relationship with Afghanistan will continue for many years to come, including an enduring and highly supportive Defence relationship.
But let me be quite clear what I mean by that.
With India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, peoples with whom we have a history longer and in some ways more fraught than with Kabul, we now have enduring partnerships as equals.
We trade, help train officials, exchange information and provide development assistance.
We plan to do the same in Afghanistan: British trainers and mentors will stay in Afghanistan and their efforts will continue alongside those of aid workers and diplomats.
These diplomatic, development and defence relationships underpin our partnership and we look forward to deepening them over the years ahead.
Afghanistan will, I am confident, contribute to the network of partners and allies that the UK has developed over the centuries.
STRATEGIC DEFENCE AND SECURITY REVIEW
Continuing the progress being made in Afghanistan was a key determinant during the SDSR. For those who rather felt that it was inconvenient, the fact is we military people live in the real world, not in the make-believe world. We are in Afghanistan and we have got to make a success of it.
I agree whole heartedly with the Secretary of State that failing to win the war we currently fight would be a betrayal of the Armed Forces, the British people and our national security.
But I also agree that configuring to fight that war, to the exclusion of all else, would have been a blindness to the other possible threats to that very national security.
The decisions taken in the SDSR have rightly been on the basis on what I think is quite excellent analysis done in the National Security Strategy which looks beyond the immediate five years at the range of risks the nation faces.
As the Prime Minister said in Parliament, “the defence review flows from strategic thinking about Britain’s place in the world, about the threats we face and about how we can bring all of the Government together to try to deal with that.”
Let me take issue with those who have said that this process was rushed and not strategy-led.
SDSR - PLANNING AND STRATEGY
First - I did not begin thinking about defence reform on the 12th of May, nor did you here at RUSI, nor did anyone in the Ministry of Defence, when Lord Hutton was there we were still thinking about it.
We all knew a recalibration was necessary and coming. Every political party was on record in support of a post-election Defence review.
The department began planning this in some detail more than a year ago and brought it to an initial conclusion in October.
For example the National Security Strategy, the DCDC Global Strategic Trends publications, the Green Paper and the Future Character of Conflict study were all published under the last Government and largely endorsed by the then Official Opposition.
They created a base on which the National Security Council, new National Security Strategy and the SDSR was built, very much based on the foreign policy of the government.
So a lot of work has taken place over a considerable time.
Today, there is no single all encompassing threat which requires our total concentration to the exclusion of others, as there was during the Cold War.
None of the threats we face - from terrorism to piracy, from regional instability to energy security, from climate change to cyber - none of these is at a definitive tipping point. So the clarity that some commentators claim is not evident in the facts.
The Government has not drawn the same strategic conclusion as some wanted, not because there is a lack of strategic direction but the reverse: to maintain our strategic freedom of manoeuvre.
We could have re-configured the capabilities of our Armed Forces towards the defence of Europe and our immediate environs as some did argue for - but that choice was rejected.
We could have re-configured towards peacekeeping rather than warfighting - that choice was rejected.
We could have re-configured towards counter-terrorism and domestic security - that choice was rejected
These options, and other scenarios, were rejected because they were not supported by the analysis underpinning the National Security Strategy as being in Britain’s long-term interests.
The Adaptable Posture - which retains the ability of the UK to act at distance, independently where required, across all domains, providing the capacity for prevention, for deterrence, both conventional and nuclear, for coercion and intervention - is a rational extension of the National Security Strategy.
Putting it into practice will create what we are calling Future Force 2020. It will be a formidable and powerful organisation - joint and across each service.
If we stayed as we were, we would not be successful in 2020 and beyond, I am absolutely convinced of it. We have turned the corner, and I would argue we have further to go, in configuring for future warfare.
If I were in the Armed Forces in 1930 I would have preferred to be fighting from an aircraft or a tank than from a horse.
Those in the Armed Forces in 2020 and beyond will, I have absolutely no doubt, be grateful for our investment today in cyber operations, ISTAR and remote technology.
It will be a similarly quantum leap.
Future Force 2020 will also maintain significant more traditional but hi-tech war-fighting capabilities across all three services.
Typhoon, JSF and an updated Strategic Lift fleet for example for the RAF.
Carrier Strike, Astute, Type 45 Destroyers, and soon after 2020, the Type 26 Global Combat Ship for the Royal Navy.
The Army will retain the mass, equipment and human skills that, I believe will be so important for the future character of warfare.
On top of this the Review of Reserves will report next year and help to shape further the Armed Forces.
Whilst concentrating upon the Reserve, it will necessarily consider military manpower more broadly within the context of the Whole Force.
The Study’s objective is to produce a detailed concept and an outline implementation plan for a future Reserve Force structure.
And this will be complemented by and integrated with the 21st century capabilities I mentioned earlier.
My aim is for my successors not to face the challenges we face today with ageing capabilities across all three services that are difficult to maintain.
But, and this is a top priority for us all in Defence, they must also inherit the priceless advantage I have in leading the very high quality people who continue to be drawn to a life of service in the Armed Forces.
Force 2020, to be what we aspire to, will absolutely depend on sustaining their commitment, resolve and high morale. And that of their families of whom we ask so much.
So let me turn to implementation.
SDSR - IMPLEMENTATION
The SDSR has undoubtedly meant taking difficult decisions.
All three services and the civil service will lose manpower - and I am painfully aware of the understandable worry caused by the decisions we have made.
I also know that decisions such as on Harrier and HMS Ark Royal, which have given exemplary service over many years, have evoked not only an understandable emotional response but controversy too.
But the package as a whole makes sense in the situation we find ourselves - fighting a war in Afghanistan, in tight financial circumstances, and in order to meet the requirements of the National Security Strategy.
The orders have now been given and in military speak, we have crossed the line of departure.
The Ark Royal has been paid off and the Harrier will tomorrow fly for the last time after coming off operations in 2009.
We must now apply ourselves to making a reality of the vision for the future.
Achieving this will not be plain sailing and much innovative and radical thinking will be required including being prepared to shed outmoded or irrelevant attitudes and structures.
First - the SDSR has provided our force structure, but much of the detail needs to be bottomed out - including how we organise the MOD around the new structure.
Work streams are currently underway on everything from a coherent basing plan to the future structure of our Reserves to bringing our people back from Germany.
And of course the Defence Reform Unit’s review under Lord Levene will report by July next year.
It would be wrong to disguise the pain in this process.
The whole department is under review and not one element of the Armed Forces is unaffected.
This is about practises and mindset as much as equipment and structures and it will be challenging for all of us and its effects will be enduring.
This will lead to difficult and politically charged decisions and will undoubtedly have resource implications.
Providing robust military advice, based on sound analysis, is the challenge which the Chiefs and I intend very much to meet.
Second - The SDSR has set us on a path to financial stability but it relies on a number of assumptions that must be met including achieving the efficiencies required.
This will not be easy - and we will face a yearly struggle to balance the books as we transition.
What is clear is that we simply cannot continue as we have over the last ten years where defence costs, particularly the cost of equipment programmes, have grown well outside predictions and outstripped planned resources.
It is also the case that, as the Defence Secretary and Prime Minister have both said, achieving Future Force 2020 will require real terms growth in the Defence budget beyond 2015.
Third - as with everything else in military operations, the enemy has a vote.
That is why defence transformation is a process not an event.
As Winston Churchill said: to improve is to change; to be perfect is to change often.
The future is dynamic and just as with the 1998 SDR, some of the assumptions we have made on the basis of the best and most rigorous analysis available will, I have no doubt, be shown to have been too optimistic or too pessimistic as time moves on.
And so we must remain adaptable, and able to revise our assumptions in line with events.
That is why the decision to have regular defence reviews I think is a powerful lever for transformation.
This brings me to my final theme of the evening - revitalising strategic thought in Whitehall.
STRATEGIC THINKING
The Public Administration Select Committee recently published a report on how strategy is made across Whitehall with specific reference to security and defence.
The report has stimulated thinking across government but perhaps especially and rightly in Defence.
The development of what some people refer to as ‘Grand Strategy’ is problematic in the complex, multi-polar world Britain now faces.
The National Security Strategy has begun the process of moving finally from the Cold War in which the containment of the Soviet Union was very much the clear and defining national security requirement and was the basis upon which UK strategy was formed.
But we should recognise that under that banner, particularly in the early parts of the Cold War, as Britain de-coupled from Empire, we also sought to operate within the three concentric circles of influence proposed by Churchill - a Europe that would unite, a Commonwealth that would remain relevant, and a United States that would increasingly lead the free world.
Some would argue that balancing these has retarded proper strategic thinking.
And that UK strategy attempts to be all things to all people - without making a choice, particularly between the US and Europe.
But there is an emerging consensus that the organising principle of states in the last half of the twentieth century is being replaced by a system more akin to the 19th Century with multiple centres of gravity, the rise of powerful nation states and renewed regional and global competition.
As the Foreign Secretary said in Washington recently: “while the world is becoming more multilateral it is also becoming more bilateral … We have to reinforce our bilateral relationships and to become more adept at leveraging new forms of influence.”
This more unpredictable world is of course complicated with 21st century technology, risk and complexity - including a mix of non-state actors.
So we need to look several decades ahead or try to and decide what Britain’s place in the world is.
If you like, redefining Churchill’s concentric circles for the 21st century to provide a new organising vision for Britain.
The National Security Strategy is a starting point and an objective to pursue in terms of the ends that are required to serve the national interests.
And the Adaptable Posture we have adopted in Defence is about balancing the complexity set out in the NSS.
But linking the ends to ways and means are where, in my view, there are weaknesses.
We need to rediscover how better to turn thinking into effect.
This is not just my view.
It is shared by many across Whitehall, and discussions have already taken place with the Prime Minister, ministers and officials on how to address this.
The Ministry of Defence and the military could have an important role to play in this process.
The military has a vast amount of experience in turning thinking into action and strategy into effect.
It has the ability to analyse, plan and to implement - often under great pressure - in a coherent manner, bringing together multiple streams of capability into one whole effort.
We can, in my view, employ the same skills to good effect in assisting the Government as a whole to apply strategic thinking and planning in national security work.
Sir Peter Ricketts, the National Security Adviser, is planning to draw together thinking across departments responsible for security and defence to scope out how this can be achieved.
So it is my intention to help prepare the Ministry of Defence to contribute to this important process.
We need to ensure that in the Ministry of Defence itself we maintain the skills underpinning the execution of strategy - such as planning, analysis and communication - and make sure our system of learning and education from junior ranks and civil servants all the way to the top continues to teach strategic thinking.
As one example of this we have renamed OP COS, the Operational Chiefs of Staff weekly meeting.
It was called this when it was set up because it was the way for the Service Chiefs and the CDS and VCDS to focus on the immediate operations of the day.
I have renamed it the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the name employed for this grouping since 1923.
The change may seem minor but it reflects my intention to raise the head of the department and reassert the aspect we have too often over looked - that of the Strategic Military Headquarters.
Individually the Single Service Chiefs and VCDS have areas of responsibility linked to their particular Service or responsibility.
Together, as a Committee, they are a hugely experienced group of military strategic thinkers as well as being the heads of the military per se.
Together with the very impressive staff that support them, they focus not just on today’s operations but wider afield and further ahead, and we can refine that more.
As I have said before but cannot repeat too often, what gives us our edge as Armed Forces, what sets our nation’s men and women apart is this in many respects - our ability to plan, to think and to continually recruit and retain the best of each generation.
Investing in high quality people in the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence is not just good for Defence, but the skills they develop and the talents they bring provide the whole of Government with a robust capability in service of the national interest.
CONCLUSION
Ladies and Gentlemen, I am acutely aware that I am all that stands between you and some well deserved festive cheer, so let me conclude, by making a few remarks.
I recently said that in my role of CDS I stand on the shoulders of giants.
The first of which are the men and women of Britain’s armed forces, who I have the honour of leading.
One need only read the citations published alongside the operational honours list to understand why the people of the United Kingdom are rightly proud of their Armed Forces.
And second, but no less important, are the families of our serving personnel.
They are the rock upon which our Armed Forces are built, and too often this is neglected.
At this time of year in particular, with more than 15,000 people on operations and deployments around the world, not just Afghanistan, we should recognise their self-less commitment and thank them for their fortitude.
And third, I stand here, of course, on the shoulders of my illustrious predecessors who have led Britain’s Armed Forces through darkness and through light, and whom I am proud and humbled to follow.
The Armed Forces have a challenging path ahead - to succeed in Afghanistan and on all other operations, to make a reality of the vision set out in the SDSR, and to act wherever necessary to keep the people of Britain safe.
We will move forward with confidence.
We will always do our duty.
We will meet every challenge and we will prevail.
That is the history of your, of Britain’s Armed Forces - and that too is our future.