When a constitutional monarchy, led by King Idris, assumed the reins of power in Libya on the 24th of December 1951, it found itself in charge of a very poor country that had been devastated by the Second World War. The monarchy also discovered that its subjects still lacked a Libyan national character: The vast majority of Libyans still saw themselves primarily as Muslims and Arabs. They were also very suspicious of the new state and unenthusiastic about compliance with its rule of law. However, because King Idris was the grandson of the founder of the religious Senussi movement, many traditional Libyans, especially of the older generations, did not rebel against him. The younger generations, however, were another kettle of fish.
Devoid of a firm Libyan national character, enveloped by a fundamentally totalitarian political culture inherited from the old days of Islam, and strongly influenced by Egyptian school teachers working in Libya and by the Egyptian Voice of the Arabs radio station, the impressionable younger Libyans easily fell victim to the rhetoric of the pan-Arabists, such as Nasser and the Ba’ath party, as well as that of the Islamists, like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Wound up by the propaganda techniques of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, many of those Libyans started to level sharp criticisms at the government of King Idris. They accused the monarchy of suppressing dissent by not allowing the existence of a multiparty system in Libya’s parliament; they were resentful of what they saw as social inequalities and widespread corruption, especially after the discovery of oil in the late 1950s; they were critical of the presence of British and American air bases on Libyan soil; and they took the monarchy to task over its tepid support for the Palestinians in their conflict with Israel. Although on the face of it such criticisms may look reasonable, closer scrutiny reveals otherwise.
It is true that the constitutional monarchy of King Idris did not permit the existence of a multiparty system, but it had very good reasons for not doing so: The vast majority of Libyans in the 1950s and the 1960s were ardent supporters of Nasser, the Ba’ath party, and the Muslim Brotherhood. The King feared that allowing the emergence of a multiparty system in Libya would lead to the domination of its parliament, and of Libya’s political life in general, by a Nasserist party, a Ba’athist party, and a Muslim Brotherhood party. That scenario, the King rightly estimated, would hand Libya’s sovereignty on a silver platter to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.
It is in fact strikingly ironic that Libyan supporters of Nasser, the Ba’ath party, and the Muslim Brotherhood denounced King Idris for not permitting the existence of a multiparty system in Libya at a time when Egypt, Syria, and Iraq did not do so either and, what is more, their oppression and persecution of their own people were far worse than anything that was ever done by the Libyan monarchy, a government that allowed much freedom of expression, did not have torture chambers, and in its eighteen years of existence, executed only one person, the Libyan Queen’s nephew, for murdering one of the King’s aides; by Middle Eastern standards, this is a quasi-mythical track record.
Likewise, the accusation of social inequality and widespread corruption was exaggerated. Libya had been a very poor country until the discovery of oil in significant quantities in the late 1950s. It was only in the early 1960s that Libya was able to export oil in commercial quantities. The few years separating Libya’s first oil export from Qaddafi’s coup d’état in 1969 were far too short for the realization of a fair and equitable distribution of Libya’s wealth among the population at large; no known country has ever accomplished such equality in such a brief time-span. And although Libya was not free of corruption, by the end of the 1960s, the monarchy’s financial auditing, monitoring, accountability, and transparency had reduced corruption to a minimum, an achievement that stood in stark contrast to the extensive corruption and glaring social injustice prevalent in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq at that time.
The historical hypersensitivity felt by Arabs and Muslims towards the West manifested itself in the position taken by many Libyans concerning the presence of two British and American air bases on Libyan soil. Both were regarded by critics of the monarchy as a physical occupation of Libya and a stigma that had to be removed, especially, those critics argued, because they were used by the Israelis to stab Egypt in the back in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war; such an accusation had rested on Nasser’s then public claim that “We thought we were going to be attacked from the east, but we were in fact attacked from the west.”
Nasser’s allegation was of course false; the British and American bases were never used to attack any Middle Eastern country. Furthermore, both the British and the Americans never used their bases to violate Libya’s sovereignty. As a matter of fact, their presence had been beneficial to Libya: Prior to the discovery of oil in 1959, that country had derived much of its national income from the renting of those bases. After Libya started to export oil in commercial quantities in the first half of the 1960s, the Libyan government renegotiated its agreements with the British and the Americans to expedite the closure of the bases; it was agreed that both bases would be removed by the early 1970s.
The hostility felt by a multitude of Libyans towards King Idris for his lack of enthusiasm for the Palestinian cause was also misplaced. The King was focused on Libya’s future and was averse to getting bogged down in the quagmire of Arab and Muslim politics. In addition, he was in favour of a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and he thought that the uncompromising radicalism of Nasser, the Ba’ath party, and the Muslim Brotherhood would inevitably bring about total disaster for the region; recent history has in fact vindicated his position.
In spite of all rational explanations to the contrary, Libyan supporters of pan-Arabism and Islamism continued to believe the propaganda of Nasser, the Ba’ath party, and the Muslim Brotherhood. The humiliating defeat by Israel of Arab and Muslim armies in the 1967 war only added fuel to the seething resentment felt by many Libyans in regard to the pro-Western government of King Idris. It was not, therefore, particularly surprising that the vast majority of Libyans welcomed Qaddafi with open arms after his successful coup d’état in 1969.
This takes me back to some of the reasons lying behind the tendency of Libyans to support totalitarianism, as mentioned earlier in the article: The harsh geographical nature of Libya, which for centuries had imposed on its people a largely nomadic way of life that prevented the formation of a Libyan national character and impeded the establishment of a stable state, had instead helped make the national identity of the Libyan population essentially Arabic and Muslim, rather than Libyan. Consequently, this made most Libyans particularly vulnerable to the preoccupations, instabilities, and complexities of Arabic and Muslim identities: The obsession with the question of Arab or Muslim unification, the adoption of Romanticism, the aversion to the liberal democratic model, the grievances resulting from a wounded national or religious pride, and so forth. The overall outcome of this was a raving, unquestioning belief by Libyans in the totalitarian, non-Libyan ideologies of pan-Arabism and Islamism. This had dire consequences for the future of Libya.
Notwithstanding the historical instability surrounding the nature of any Libyan state, the constitutional monarchy of King Idris could have continued to survive if either of the two following scenarios had materialized: (a) If the King had transformed the Libyan state into a ruthless dictatorship, or (b) if the majority of Libyans had supported the King’s government. Given the tolerant, liberal, and humane nature of Libya’s monarchy, the first option- setting up a brutal dictatorship- would not have been feasible. However, if Libyans had stood by their constitutional government, the monarchy would most probably have continued to govern Libya for a long time thereafter. In that case, it is very likely that Libya would have developed far better than it later did under Qaddafi. Tragically, and largely for the reasons shown above, this was not to be. Nevertheless, Libyans had a choice.
Several decades ago, the vast majority of Libyans rejected a constitutional monarchy that was politically tolerant, economically sound, and administratively competent, where the rule of law reigned supreme, and where the country’s education system, health care, and infrastructure received huge proportions of Libya’s limited budget. Libyans lived in peace in their own country, and they found it easy to travel to other countries because of Libya’s good reputation.
Instead, those Libyans welcomed Qaddafi with open arms. They gave their firm support to a dictatorship that was politically murderous, economically wasteful, and administratively corrupt, where the personal whims of Qaddafi, his family members, and his sycophants reigned supreme, and where the country’s education system, health care, and infrastructure received very little of Libya’s huge budget. Libyans lived in hell in their own country, and they found it very difficult to travel anywhere because of Libya’s bad reputation.
The remarkable degrees of uncertainty, insecurity, and instability that have plagued Libya for the last two years are the product of the choice that was made by the Libyan people forty four years ago. When “The people spoke” in Libya in September 1969, they spoke folly.