Those more recent developments further complicated Libya’s struggle with lawlessness and instability: Intense fighting has taken place between the LNA and the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shoura Council (BRSC) in Benghazi; between Al-Qaeda and IS in Derna; between Libya Dawn and LNA in central and western Libya; between Libya Dawn and IS in Sirte; between the PFG and IS in the oil-rich central region of Libya; and between the pro-Libya Dawn Tuareg and the pro-LNA Tabou in the Libyan Sahara. But the greatest concern for all- especially in the West- was the increasingly disconcerting presence of IS in Libya. IS had flourished in Syria and Iraq starting from 2014, the year that saw their lightning-and-thunder seizure of large areas of that part of the Middle East. The world was winded by IS’s fanatically ruthless efficiency before it felt squeamish at their cold-blooded butchery of defenceless civilians. Once IS began beheading Western hostages, Western powers reacted by launching a prolonged campaign of aerial bombardment of IS, coupled with extensive assistance to anti-IS forces in the Middle East in respect of intelligence, special forces, and logistics. Later, Russia entered the fray by actively supporting President Assad’s forces against his opponents, particularly IS and the Islamist An-Nusra Front. The resulting curtailment of IS in both Syria and Iraq led to an increasing transfer of many IS fighters to Libya. Those were estimated to be in the thousands (up from hundreds) and have been based mainly in Sirte, Qaddafi’s hometown, which they governed. IS’s presence in Sirte had principally been facilitated by masses of profoundly disgruntled Qaddafi supporters who had experienced defeat and humiliation at the hands of the anti-Qaddafi forces, something which is reminiscent of how many Sunni Iraqis had collaborated with IS after the former had been let down by the United States in the aftermath of their decisive contribution to the defeat of Al-Qaeda in Iraq in what became known as As-Sahwa (The Awakening), thereby exposing them to inhumane persecution by the Shi’ite government of Nuri Al-Maliki.
The presence of IS in Libya has made Western countries nervous given the proximity of Libya to Europe, its huge oil reserves, and the more recent masses of migrants wishing to get into Europe through Libya. IS had entered Libya in 2014 when religious extremists- taking advantage of the country’s chaos- established a base for IS in the eastern city of Derna. From there, they had allegedly expanded to the city of Benghazi (fighting alongside other Islamists such as Ansar Al-Sharia), to the central city of Sirte which they later controlled, and to the historical city of Sabratha from which they launched terrorist attacks in Tripoli and in Tunisia. Consequently, Western powers have of late been very active in providing covert support to Libya’s anti-IS forces (to the LNA in Benghazi and to the GNA and its Misratan allies in the western part of Libya.)
Both Libyans and the international community have been at a loss as to how to resolve Libya’s quagmire. IS is not the cause of Libya’s schizophrenia; instead, it is one of its symptoms. As we have already seen, the real culprits for Libya’s travails are that country’s authoritarian political culture, Qaddafi’s narcissistic megalomania, and the shortcomings of Western policies in dealing effectively with the aftermath of the collapse of the ancien régime and with the rise of IS in Libya. However, there are other noteworthy reasons that may help explain that country’s continuing suffering: The western part of Libya is generally run by forces which are mostly made up of militias from the city of Misrata, and those are allied with some Islamist forces, while the eastern part of Libya is largely controlled by the LNA, in alliance with Salafists. The LNA and its supporters see the Misratan militias as lawless, as Islamists, and as the reason why the internationally-recognized House of Representatives is now in Tobruk and its government in Beida, having been forced to flee Tripoli after securing majority votes in Libya’s democratic elections of 2014. Many in the eastern part of Libya also take the Misratan militias to task for having been responsible for the destruction of Tripoli’s international airport when they fought against forces from Zintan in 2014, for the persecution of many Libyan Tawirghans and their expulsion from the city of Tawirgha following the defeat of Qaddafi’s forces, for the attacks on Libya’s oil facilities in the centre of Libya, and for providing financial and logistical support to Islamists fighting in the city of Benghazi. For their part, the Misratan militias consider the LNA and its supporters to be made up of ex-members of the Qaddafi regime, mercenaries, and federal separatists; the Misratans argue that Libyans did not make the revolution against Qaddafi only for them to hand Libya on a silver platter back to his henchmen, especially Khalifa Hefter of whom they have been scathingly scornful. Misratans have also been very critical of the tribal tendencies of eastern Libya which they see as undermining the urbanization and unity of the country; they have cited some examples to illustrate the tribalist nature of eastern Libya’s politics: One of those occurred in a meeting of notables from the tribe of Al-Awaghir, when complaints were made about how that particular tribe got nothing from Libya’s spoils, unlike other eastern tribes who had secured the government (Al-Bara’sa), parliament (Al-I’bidat), and oil (Al-Magharba); another example that has been mentioned is how both the Bara’sa tribe and the Drissa tribe fought over whom to appoint as Libya’s ambassador to Egypt; the issue was apparently “resolved” in the end when two Libya ambassadors to Egypt were appointed, one from each of those two tribes! Continuing tensions within eastern Libya’s numerous tribes have combined with those between city-dwellers and Bedouins to tear apart the social fabric of that part of the country.
More recently, the Misratan militias have allied themselves with the GNA and are now fighting a largely successful war against IS in Sirte- IS’s last bastion- under the name of “Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous,” or “The Solid Structure” (which is taken from the Quran: As-Saff, Chapter 61, Verse 4.) Western countries and the United Nations have been pushing for the GNA to be recognized as Libya’s only legitimate government; in the process, they have rejected the legitimacy of the Thinni government in the east of the country, although they still recognize the House of Representatives that had appointed it. Misrata’s alliance with the GNA seems to have given its militias a big boost in terms of weight and relevance. By contrast, the east-based government and the LNA with which it is allied appear to be losing credibility, something which has been made worse by their reluctance to recognize and work with the internationally-backed GNA. The House of Representatives, its government, and the LNA do not want to give up military (or political) control to the GNA-linked Presidential Council which they accuse of being Islamist. For its part, the Presidential Council insists on the command of all of Libya’s armed forces. Neither side is willing to budge. At this point in Libya’s modern history, it seems that a unified government is out of reach. Libya appears to have reached a stalemate. It is certainly far from easy to see how the present deadlock can be overcome. The eastern and western parts of Libya give the impression that they are irreconcilable, with the LNA and Libya Dawn coming across as uncompromisingly discordant. One cannot help but remember what the late Bourguiba, Tunisia’s first post-independence president, once told Qaddafi: “Before you start talking about how to unify the Arabs, just go and unify the Libyans!”